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Abstract: The outcome of the Brexit referendum has led to a highly mediatized battle of power between 
the British government and parliament over how much influence the latter can exert over the British 
position in the negotiations with the European Union. At the same time, the role of parliaments in the 
remaining member states has received virtually no public attention, despite the fact that the stakes are 
also high for their publics. The aim of our paper is to shed light on dynamics of parliamentary control 
of Brexit in the remaining member states through a comparative study of the German, Czech and 
Luxembourgish parliaments. Each of these member states has one or several key interests at stake in 
the negotiations, such as exports, the financial sector and future contributions to the EU budget 
(Germany, Luxembourg), or migration to the UK and the maintenance of EU policies and their 
budgetary health (Czech Republic). The three cases represent geographical diversity and differently 
sized countries, to take into account different levels of governmental-influence over the Brexit 
negotiations. The study will focus on the formal powers of parliaments, their actual mobilization and 





The outcome of the British referendum on the UK membership of the European Union raised more 
challenges than expected. Governments quickly realized that they not only had to renegotiate the 
relationship between the UK and the EU across a wide-range of policies, but that they were also facing 
questions in terms of process. One question that almost immediately emerged on both sides of the 
tables was about parliaments: To what extent should the national parliaments and the European 
Parliament be informed about the negotiations? Should they be consulted, and if so at regular intervals 
or mostly at the end of the process? Should they be able to approve or reject the outcome? 
In the case of the European Parliament, its formal powers are defined by Art. 50 TEU: it must give its 
consent to the final agreement for the agreement to take effect. The European Parliament used this 
formal power to clarify at an early stage of the negotiations that it did not intend to simply vote once 
at the end of the negotiations, but that it also expected to be regularly briefed and consulted during 
the negotiations. 
The case of national parliaments is less clear, as Art. 50 TEU makes no reference to them: The EU 
Treaties usually do not interfere in what are considered domestic power structures. In the case of 
Britain, this ambiguity resulted in a public argument about the role of parliament both in triggering 
Brexit and in approving the final settlement. Originally, the British government intended to minimize 
the role of parliament in Brexit – a stance that clashed with a claim of the Brexit campaign to defend 
parliamentary sovereignty. In practice, the argument resulted in a high-profile court case and repeated 
stand-offs between parliament and government that are ongoing at the time of writing (February 
2018) and that attracted the attention of both the media and academics (e.g. Gee and Young 2016; 
Phillipson 2016; Eleftheriadis 2017; Mabbett 2017; Poole 2017).  
By contrast, the question of the rights of the parliaments of the EU-27 has attracted little public or 
scholarly attention. Is this indicative of a lack of interest on the part of the parliaments? Do they accept 
that the Brexit negotiations are the prerogative of governments or do they feel that the impact of 
Brexit will be too small/unpredictable to merit attention? These doubts can be quickly dismissed. 
According to the 27th COSAC report (COSAC 2017) 35 out of 37 parliaments and parliamentary 
chambers that took part in its survey want their governments to regularly inform them about the Brexit 
negotiations. 28 out of 38 parliaments or chambers would like to have the opportunity to ask questions 
from the negotiating team and discuss the progress of negotiations. Finally, 21 out of 38 parliaments 
think that the European Commission and national parliaments should come together on a regular basis 
to discuss the negotiations. Despite the absence of a public debate on the powers of parliaments, 
national parliaments in the EU-27 are thus clearly interested in Brexit scrutiny.  
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The aim of this chapter is to analyse national parliaments along the four dimensions outlined in the 
introductory chapter of this volume. The constitutional dimension covers the formal powers of 
national parliaments and we are looking in particular at the dynamics of the executive-legislative 
relationship as well as the role of bicameralism. Regarding the procedural dimension, we analyse how 
national parliaments make use of these procedures in practice, whether they attempt to modify 
existing procedures and to what extent they make use of interparliamentary channels. The party-
political dimension analyses to what extent parliamentary debates are shaped by differences between 
governing and opposition parties in Brexit scrutiny, including Eurosceptic parties, and to what extent 
the ‘national interest’ acts as a unifying factor or determines the precise issues that receive attention. 
For these purposes, the paper compares three cases – Germany, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg. 
The paper is based on qualitative interviews and document analysis from 2013-2017, encompassing 
the period before the Brexit referendum and the first phase of the Brexit negotiations.  
State of the art  
The case of Brexit is unique. No member state has ever left the EU, and there are thus no historical 
examples of how parliaments could, would or should be involved in this process. However, Brexit 
happens in the context of an evolution of national parliamentary involvement in EU policy-making that 
spans decades, and it thus can be placed in this literature.  
Firstly, the Brexit negotiations are an executive-dominated process – especially as far as the EU-27 are 
concerned. Before the Brexit referendum, the negotiation of a special deal for Britain, should it choose 
to remain, was dominated by the member state governments and the European Commission, with no 
formal involvement of national parliaments. Since the referendum, the EU negotiation team responds 
primarily to a mandate from the European Council and to potential pressures from the EP. The role of 
national parliaments in this is again not spelled out. As art. 50 TEU does not mention national 
parliaments, the final decisions on Brexit could probably be taken without national parliamentary 
involvement – unless national parliaments insist that their government consults them before the final 
vote. This situation is reminiscent of the literature on national parliaments in the EU pre-2005, which 
argued largely that Europeanization was synonymous with an increase in executive dominance and a 
weakening of national parliaments: As competences moved to the European level, governments 
turned into legislators in the Council of Ministers, and national parliaments struggled to control them 
due to a mix of a lack of formal powers, an information deficit and disinterest. Very few parliaments – 
such as the Nordic parliaments, managed to set up effective scrutiny systems (cf. Norton 1996; Maurer 
and Wessels 2001; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007).  
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However, the situation of national parliaments has substantially improved since the early 2000s. As 
national parliaments became aware of their loss of powers, they started to fight back by demanding 
more formal powers (e.g. better control powers over the government), by setting up specialized EU 
affairs committees to conduct the scrutiny and by demanding reform on the European level (e.g. 
Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Bergman et al. 2003; Auel, 2005). Winzen thus argues that the strength of 
national parliaments in EU policy-making overall increased from 2000 to 2010 (Winzen, 2012, 663-5). 
Winzen noted that the member states that joined after 2004 did indeed tend to give their national 
parliaments more formal powers of scrutiny. 
The recognition of national parliaments in the Treaty of Lisbon and the introduction of the Early 
Warning System, that gives national parliaments an opportunity to object to new European legislation, 
if it violates the principle of subsidiarity, marks a new step in the strengthening of national parliaments. 
While the Early Warning System concerns only EU legislation (and does not cover the Brexit 
negotiations), it did motivate many national parliaments to further improve their scrutiny procedures, 
encourage sectoral committees to comment on EU affairs falling into their areas of expertise, and liaise 
more actively with other European Parliaments in COSAC (e.g. Auel and Christiansen 2015; Gattermann 
et al. 2016). Högenauer and Neuhold also show that many national parliaments increased the number 
of EU experts at their disposal after the Treaty of Lisbon and gave them an important supporting role 
in scrutiny (Högenauer and Neuhold 2015; Högenauer et al. 2016). The Eurozone and immigration 
crises led to a further mobilization of national parliaments, as they highlighted the potential salience 
of EU affairs for voters. Auel and Höing (2015) show that the parliaments of countries that were 
particularly affected by the Eurozone crisis are more likely to scrutinize EU affairs actively, thus showing 
that scrutiny can be driven by national salience and key events. In addition, national parliaments with 
strong formal powers are more likely to be active scrutinizers. Finally, national parliaments recently 
started to assert their influence in the course of major international trade negotiations, such as the 
trade agreements with Canada and the United States. They are thus better prepared for the 
complicated process of the Brexit negotiations than they would have been 15 or 20 years ago.  
Based on the literature on parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs more generally, we thus have a number 
of expectations as regards national parliaments and Brexit. Firstly, we expect institutional strength (i.e. 
formal powers) to have a positive impact on levels of scrutiny. In addition, we would expect the size of 
the country to matter, as the governments of large countries are more likely to be able to shape the 
outcome of the negotiations (and to shape them across a range of areas) compared to the 
governments of small countries. As the governments of small countries will find it difficult to defend 
even a small number of key interests, we expect their parliaments to be more supportive of the 
governments and also rally around key national interests. Existing research also suggests that there 
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are differences in activity between upper and lower houses and between unicameral and bicameral 
systems. Unicameral parliaments, according Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea, “are clearly the most active 
when it comes to issuing mandates or resolutions, but they debate EU affairs far less often in the 
plenary than chambers in bicameral parliaments” (Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea 2015:75). Thus, we 
expect the parliaments to follow a similar path in case of Brexit – the Luxembourgish parliament 
focusing on resolutions, whereas the Czech and German chambers will make active use of debates. 
Finally, just as parliamentary scrutiny of the eurozone crisis depended on national salience, we also 
expect the scrutiny of Brexit to focus on issues salient for the member state in question and to be 
driven by key events. In other words, we expect different parliaments to talk about different types of 
issues. Regarding the party politics dimension, we expect to find differences between opposition and 
government as well as between Eurosceptics and pro EU parties.  
To test these expectations, we have chosen three countries (Germany, the Czech Republic and 
Luxembourg) that correspond to a large, a medium-sized and a small member state and that include 
two bicameral parliaments and one unicameral parliament. The German parliament has the most 
extensive formal powers (ranked joint 6th in the EU by Winzen 2012 with a score of 2.17), compared to 
the Czech Parliament (1.83) and the Luxembourgish parliament (0.67). More recently, Auel, Rozenberg 
and Tacea (2015) produced similar results on institutional strength. In their overview, both German 
chambers belong among the strongest EU chambers (0.78 for Bundestag ranking 2nd and 0.62 for 
Bundesrat ranking 8th) followed by closely by the Czech chambers (0.59 for Senate ranking 10th, 0.58 
for Chamber of Deputies ranking 11th). On the contrary, Luxembourg can be found towards the 
bottom of the chart (0.40) (Auel, Rozenberg, Tacea 2015). The same authors also measured EU national 
parliaments’ activity score in EU affairs. Here the picture looks different. The Bundestag moves down 
to rank 5 (0.34), followed by the Czech Senate (0.33, rank 6), which now surpassed the Bundesrat (0.24 
rank 13). The Luxembourgian parliament moved up towards the lower middle (0.16), swopping places 
with the Czech lower house now towards the bottom rank (0.10).  
In our case selection, we moreover tried to combine a good balance of a set of criteria beyond 
institutional powers. The theory suggests that the salience of an issue and national interests impact 
the parliamentary scrutiny activity. We have therefore selected countries that are all differently 
affected by Brexit and which are expected to play a different role in the whole process. Germany 
represents a member state that is expected to be heard much during the negotiations. Specific 
concerns for Germany is the financial contribution to the EU budget as well as its benefit from the 
latter, as well as its trade sector and citizen mobility. In the Czech Republic Brexit is perceived as a 
salient issue, but the number of concerns is limited to several key areas – particularly citizens´ rights 
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and budgetary health. Luxembourg represents a case where the salience of Brexit is high in a key 
economic sector – the financial sector.  
Constitutional dimension 
The formal powers of the three case studies of parliaments in EU affairs differ along two lines – 
whether the powers are centred around information-gathering or government control, and whether 
only the EAC is responsible for EU affairs or whether all affected committees are.  
The Luxembourgish parliament is the weakest parliament of the three in EU affairs: The Constitution 
is silent on the role of parliament in EU affairs. Instead, parliament defines the scrutiny procedures 
autonomously in its rules of procedure (RoP) (Spreitzer 2014). Most of the rules are contained in an 
Aide-Mémoire on the cooperation between the Chamber and the Government included in Annex 2 of 
the RoP. It is worth noting that the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs shares the 
responsibility over EU affairs with the sectoral committees, which are expected to issue opinions on 
matters falling into their area of expertise.  
According to the Aide-Mémoire, the parliament has the right to receive a wide range of EU documents, 
to be informed by the government orally or in writing about topics that are salient for Luxembourg. In 
addition, the sectoral committees can invite members of the government to answer questions before 
and after Council or European Council meetings. However, it has no mandating powers, and while the 
government should transmit information in time to allow the Chambre to define its own position and 
send it to the government, the government is not obliged to follow that position. In addition, the 
government will present an annual report on EU politics. In practice, the report is usually presented by 
the Foreign minister and followed by a public debate.  The report on EU politics is of relevance in this 
context, as it allowed for extensive debates on Brexit and the Future of the EU more generally. Finally, 
the government has to inform the Chambre about accession negotiations when a new state wishes to 
join the EU, set out its own position and consult parliament. Technically these rules do not mention 
states leaving the Union, but one can assume that the Chamber will expect them to apply to Brexit.  
By contrast, the chambers of the Czech parliament are far more powerful. Regarding the institutional 
set-up of the Czech European policy, both chambers are in a similar position and have similar tasks. 
Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have their own EU affairs committee (EAC). They are 
the most important actors shaping the chambers’ EU policies as plenaries very rarely change or reject 
motions for resolution proposed by the EACs (Hrabálek, Strelkov 2015: 496). The EACs of both 
chambers share similar tasks. They focus on subsidiarity checks of EU legislation proposals, assessing 
EU legislation and scrutinizing governmental EU policy. Further details are in cases of both chambers 
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specified in their respective rules of procedures. There is no formal document defining mutual relations 
between both chambers in the EU affairs.  
Regarding Brexit, no changes to the internal procedures or relations between chambers and 
government have been adopted. Only the lower house´s EAC is considering the possibility to establish 
a specialized Brexit subcommittee or a specific working group. This possibility was discussed in the 
beginning of January 2018 (Interview with Ondřej Benešík, Chair of the Committe for EU Affairs, 
Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 16/1/2018.). The chair of the Chamber 
of Deputies’ EAC is also considering requesting government to regularly report not only on its mandate 
for European Council meetings, but also on the Council’s outcomes. By the end of February 2018 this 
had, however, not been mentioned or proposed in any official document (Interview with Ondřej 
Benešík, Chair of the Committee for EU Affairs, Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech 
Republic, 16/1/2018). 
The German Bundestag is very influential. While it has no formal mandating powers, its positions are 
semi-binding: the exit of a member state falls under Art. 23 of the German constitution as described 
in the following: § 8 EUZBBG determines that the government, before participating in the negotiations 
on Art. 50, must give the Bundestag the opportunity to issue a statement. If the Bundestag does issue 
a statement, the government must take this as a basis for the negotiations (§ 8 Abs. 2 EUZBBG). The 
German constitution (article 23) states that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat participate in European 
affairs. To this end, the German government must inform both extensively and as early as possible. 
The right for information includes the opinion formation within the government as well as the 
preparation and the proceedings of negotiations within the institutions of the EU (§ 3 Abs. 2 S. 1 
EUZBBG; EUZBLG §3). The ‘regulation about the cooperation of federal government and Bundestag in 
European affairs (EUZBBG, July 2013)’ adds that the government must inform the Bundestag 
continuously and generally in written form. The German government is moreover obliged to inform 
the Bundesrat about undertakings in the scope of the EU, if these concern the interests of the 
Bundesländer (EUZBLG §2). In other words, the government must send explanatory memoranda 
outlining its position to the Bundestag on all EU proposals, and to the Bundesrat on all those potentially 
concerning the interests of the Bundesländer. It briefs the Bundestag and Bundesrat before taking a 
position in the Council and reports to both about the positions taken.  
Article 45 determines that the Bundestag must summon the EAC, making it one of only a few 
committees mentioned explicitly in the constitution. The EAC is the central place for debates on 
European politics in the Bundestag. It has interdisciplinary responsibilities, set up as an integrated and 
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cross-sectoral committee.1 In the case of Brexit, the issue was also raised in other committees, such as 
the economic committee, but the EAC was the most important venue for discussing Brexit (Interview 
with CDU 27/04/2018; interview with SPD 19/04/2018, interview with Die LINKE 13/04/2018). The EAC 
of the Bundesrat consults all EU Council and Commission proposals, esp. for regulations and guidelines, 
as well as white and green papers that are concerning the interests of the Bundesländer and performs 
subsidiarity checks.2 In addition, every committee has the power to summon a member of the 
government to provide written or oral statements (COSAC 2017).  
In addition, European issues in the Bundestag are supported by a special ‘Europe department’ in the 
administration, with one staff dedicated exclusively to the EAC. It also created a horizontal informal 
working group including all the departments divisions in response to Brexit helping to formulate the 
future relationship in more detail, for example concerning research, politics, migration and defence.  
It is to be expected that for the regulation of the future (trade) relations between the EU and the UK a 
new agreement will be passed, such as an association after Art. 217 AEUV or an agreement after Art. 
218 AEUV (Lippert, van Ondorza 2016). Whether Art. 23 of the German constitution or Art. 59 Abs. 2 
S. 1 German constitution or yet another regulation applies, has not been clarified yet.3 The last 
element, the adaptation of the founding treaties after the UK’s exit, will require the participation of 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat according to Art. 23 of the German constitution. Regarding scrutiny, 
there is a crucial difference between the Luxembourgish parliament on the one hand and the Czech 
Republic and Germany on the other. Luxembourg has a unicameral parliament. Both the Czech 
Republic and Germany have bicameral parliaments, with the upper houses having an independent 
scrutiny impact and acting as their own actors at EU level. Our analysis shows that when differentiating 
between the scrutiny activities of the unicameral parliament and the upper (the Czech Senate and the 
German Bundesrat) and the lower houses (the Czech Chamber of Deputies and the German 
Bundestag), we get different results in terms of frequency and intensity of scrutiny around Brexit-
related issues.  
These results confirm recent research showing that unicameral parliaments, upper and lower houses 
vary not only in terms of their institutional rights and their general level of activity, but also regarding 
                                                          
1 The Bundestag EAC, however, is not the only committee responsible for the scrutiny of EU proposals. All 
committees discuss European affairs within their respective specialized areas. But the EAC is interdisciplinary and 
deals with cross-cutting policy as well as issues relating to European integration in particular. It scrutinizes the 
government’s position throughout the whole EU legislative process and on all proposals. More details on 
https://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/ausschuesse18/a21/rechtsgrundlagen (accessed 20/02/2018). 
2 See https://www.bundesrat.de/DE/bundesrat/ausschuesse/eu/eu.html?nn=4353202 (accessed 20/02/2018). 
3 See https://www.bundestag.de/blob/484626/a4135f26572436921ebcd0baa150a63b/wd-3-224-16-pdf-
data.pdf (accessed 20/02/2018).  
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their kind of activity (Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea 2015). Unicameral parliaments, according to Auel, 
Rozenberg and Tacea, “are clearly the most active when it comes to issuing mandates or resolutions, 
but they debate EU affairs far less often in the plenary than chambers in bicameral parliaments” (Auel, 
Rozenberg and Tacea 2015:75). We cannot confirm this for the Luxembourg parliament in the case of 
Brexit. Attempts to actively control the government through resolutions were very rare. Instead, Brexit 
was debated in the plenary as well as in the EAC, although starting only at a later stage in comparison 
to the Czech Republic, namely in 2016. Six parliamentary questions were asked in 2016 and 2017; one 
by the Déi Lénk on whether the Luxembourgish government would try to negotiate bilateral deals, and 
five by the CSV on the legality of the special deal that the EU had negotiated with the UK in February 
2016, how many British citizens had applied for Luxembourgish citizenship, how to deal with highly 
skilled migrants from Britain after Brexit, whether there the government had commissioned impact 
assessments on Brexit, and whether the government had a strategy in the event of a hard Brexit. The 
Luxembourg parliament can therefore be categorized as Brexit scrutinizer and as an arena where an 
active Brexit debate is motivated. 
As mentioned above, both German and Czech chambers rank high with regards to institutional strength 
(Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea 2015), which strongly correlates with a high level of activity. Taking Auel, 
Rozenberg and Tacea’s findings as a basis, we would expect the German Bundestag to be extremely 
active in debating Brexit in the EAC, and at the same time also very actively debating Brexit in its 
plenary. Whilst we only have access to plenary protocols and not to EAC protocols, we do know that 
the Bundestag treats Brexit as a highly political topic. Brexit was debated oftentimes in the plenary and 
was frequently subject of debate in the EAC: 14 out of 55 meetings in the period between June 2015 
until December 2017 had Brexit on the agenda (Interview with CDU 27/04/2018; interview with SPD 
19/04/2018, interview with Die LINKE 13/04/2018; COSAC 2017). All parliamentary groups have set up 
internal structures to be able to follow the process through extensively. This is similar for the way 
Brexit is treated politically in the EAC. The parliamentary groups each have a member in the EAC 
dedicated specifically to ‘Brexit’ and Great Britain, who take the lead on the debate for their 
parliamentary group. The Bundestag EAC is also regularly receiving visits from Michel Barnier and other 
members of the European Commission’s Article 50 Task Force. In addition to the weekly EAC meetings, 
a weekly one-hour-meeting of correspondents, where experts, the ministry of foreign affairs, and chief 
negotiators from the German government and the Commission took part, was set up in response to 
Brexit. These meetings have not been reinstated since the elections in autumn 2017, but according to 
one interviewee this is likely to be taken up again (interview with the Bundestag administration 
19/04/2018). Also, the individual party factions set up internal working groups in response to Brexit 
(Interview with CDU 27/04/2018; interview with SPD 19/04/2018, interview with Die LINKE 
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13/04/2018). This confirms the Bundestag as active Brexit scrutinizer and as an arena for active Brexit 
debate, whilst resolutions and mandates were less important parliamentary tools for Brexit in the 
Bundestag. 
The Czech Chamber of Deputies, on the other hand, would be expected to be a ‘Brexit scrutiny laggard’, 
with a very low overall level of activity, according to Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea’s results. This is, 
however, not the case. The Czech Chamber of Deputies discussed Brexit in 26 percent of its EAC 
minutes in the period from 27/11/2013 until 26/10/2017. Whilst Brexit was debated to a lesser extent 
and more broadly in the plenary, debates regularly took place in context with statements given by the 
government prior to European Council meetings. A motion for a resolution was agreed within the EAC, 
but did not get approved in the plenary in time before the electoral campaign. The Czech Chamber of 
Deputies can thus be concluded to be an active Brexit scrutinizer, however, without actual attempts 
to influence the government or the European Commission. 
The literature would expect the Bundesrat to foremost make use of mandates and resolutions as Brexit 
scrutiny tools on EU affairs. In the case of Brexit, the Bundesrat made use of its plenary to debate the 
topic in far less instances than the Bundestag (mentioned in six plenaries, two of which had Brexit on 
the agenda). We lack information on the use of the Bundesrat EAC for debating Brexit. The Bundesrat 
did, however, pass a resolution demanding the government keep the Bundesrat informed closely and 
appropriately (according to Art. 23) during the negotiations of the UK’s exit and the regulation of a 
new partnership. It moreover requested for two members of the Bundesrat to participate in the EU 
Councils working group on Brexit (according to EUZBLG §6). This confirms the Bundesrat as ‘policy 
shaper’, attempting to influence the government’s Brexit negotiating position through resolution(s). 
The Czech Senate would be expected to be extraordinarily active in debating Brexit in the plenary. We 
found this to be true, with Brexit discussed in ranging between 50% of its EAC minutes in the period 
from 21/11/2014 until 18/10/2016 and 81% in the period from 16/11/2016 until 31/12/2017. 
Additionally, we find the Czech Senate to be very actively debating Brexit in the plenary, covering a 
range of Brexit-related issues. The Czech Senate moreover adopted three resolutions, one requesting 
that government to keep the Senate informed about the negotiations progress and to “consult Senate 
regarding the future relation between EU and United Kingdom as well as the future relation between 
the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom” (Senate Minutes 14/7/2016). The other two resolutions 
interpreted the British departure from the EU in a broader context: a resolution on the White paper 
on the future of the EU (Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Resolution No. 232) and a 
resolution on the future of the EU (Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Resolution No. 138). 
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The Czech Senate is thus a very active Brexit scrutinizer as well as an active ‘policy shaper’, attempting 
to influence the government’s Brexit negotiating position through resolutions. 
In summary, we find the different parliaments, unicameral, and the upper and lower houses in the 
bicameral parliaments, to vary in their approach to Brexit scrutiny or rather their interpretation of their 
role vis-à-vis the government on Brexit-related issues. However, all chambers were found – to varying 
degrees – to be active in their chosen roles: Whether as active scrutinizers and arena for active debate 
(Czech Senate, Bundestag, Czech Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourg parliament) or as policy shapers 
(Czech Senate, Bundesrat). 
Procedural dimension 
In this section, we will analyse for what purpose the three parliaments used their procedures, whether 
they tried to extend them, and the role played by channels of interparliamentary cooperation. 
Firstly, in terms of how parliaments make use of available procedures, our documentary analysis and 
interviews showed that parliamentary scrutiny of Brexit until late 2017 was a) largely reactive, b) that 
parliaments nevertheless tried to improve existing procedures, but c) mostly focused on information 
gathering rather than influence in practice. The fact that the first stage of Brexit negotiations revolved 
around issues on which the EU-27 could generally agree undoubtedly contributed to this. Thus, all 
three governments supported the common EU position, and all three parliaments supported their 
governments, which meant that all three parliaments had broadly similar positions. All three wanted 
to prevent ‘cherry-picking’ on the part of the UK, insisted that the single market goes hand in hand 
with the four freedoms and that the questions of the rights of EU and British migrants after Brexit has 
to be resolved. Moreover, all four expected the Northern Ireland question to be resolved and the UK 
to pay its financial obligations. In addition, there are a few country-specific concerns, such as the 
German contribution to the EU budget or the future of the financial place in Luxembourg.  
Overall, we found that the timing of parliamentary activities in all cases followed a similar path and 
direction: all chambers were rather reactive than active, i.e. their Brexit activities were shaped by 
external events, be it the British referendum or subsequent European Council meetings. Whereas we 
can hardly find any substantial interest in UK issues prior to June 20164, the referendum and its result 
triggered plenary debates in all cases. Secondly, all chambers were in this sense reactive to actions by 
their government, locked in their institutional possibilities and traditions. In the Czech case, for 
                                                          
4 For example, the Czech parliament started to follow the issue prior to the 2015 June European Council meeting 
(Chamber of Deputies, European Affairs Committee Minutes 24/06/2015, Senate of of the Parliament of the 
Czech Republic European Affairs Committee Minutes 13/6/2015). During this period, however, the agenda of the 
British future in the EU was heavily overshadowed by the migration crisis. The same applies to Luxembourgish 
parliament, which started to become more active since 2015, showing no interest in 2013 or 2014. 
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example, Brexit was discussed particularly in the context of governmental mandates for European 
Council meetings (and in the case of the Senate also debriefings on their outcomes). In the 
Luxembourgish case, scrutiny also largely revolves around committee or plenary debates with 
ministers.5 Unique was, however, the weekly hour to report on Brexit, which the German parliament 
had institutionalised during the previous government (see section above), in addition to plenary and 
committee debates in response to external events.  
However, we can see differences in how the parliaments de facto positioned themselves on the 
procedural level. All three parliaments improved their scrutiny procedures for the Brexit negotiations. 
The Luxembourgish and Czech parliaments focused on information gathering, whereas the German 
parliament tried to improve its channels for influence.  
In the Luxembourgish case, the parliament adopted a resolution in July 2017 asking the ministers to 
attend committee meetings after every session of EU negotiation on Brexit (4/07/2017). However, 
both the German and Czech parliaments pushed more actively for special procedures on Brexit and/or 
had more extensive formal powers to begin with. In the Czech case, the EAC can mandate the 
government before Council meetings (unlike the Luxembourgish EAC). In addition, on 27th of June a 
special Working group for Brexit and the future of the EU was established under the supervision of the 
Office of Government. In the beginning of its existence, the composition of the group was criticized by 
the opposition, particularly in the Chamber of Deputies EAC (Chamber of Deputies, European Affairs 
Committee Minutes 15/9/2016). Apart from this group, a political group consisting of representatives 
of major political parties was established. This group also involved MPs and its activity resulted in a 
deal on Czech priorities for Brexit negotiations signed in February 2017, as mentioned in the previous 
section. 
In the German case, all parties in both chambers demanded to be informed continuously and 
thoroughly about the Brexit negotiations. The Bundestag wished to be in direct contact with the 
negotiating team as well as other parliaments and the European Commission, being given the 
opportunity to ask questions and obtain further clarifications on the progress of the negotiations 
(COSAC 2017). The Bundesrat took a proactive step to assure its involvement: On 31 March 2017 the 
Bundesrat passed a resolution clarifying that it expects the government to keep the Bundesrat 
informed closely and appropriately (according to Art. 23) during the negotiations of the UK’s exit and 
the regulation of a new partnership. In addition, it asked to participate in the deliberations of the 
government’s position already before negotiations were taken up, as well as during negotiations, and 
                                                          
5 There were three plenary debates in Luxembourg on Brexit between 2015 – 2017. Moreover, on 21 March 2017 
Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn briefed the Chambre on the key issues of the first stage of the negotiations. 
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demanded two members of the Bundesrat to be allowed to participate in the EU Councils working 
group on Brexit (according to EUZBLG §6). It moreover expects to be included in the legislative 
measures for the adaptation to Brexit at the national level at an early stage. In response, the minister 
of state Michael Roth judged in agreement with the government that the Bundesländer are “generally 
not concerned” (member of the Bundesrat, plenary protocol 31 March 2017) during the negotiations 
of the European Council in the first phase of setting up guidelines for negotiation. This caused great 
discontent amongst members of the Bundesrat at the plenary (protocol 31 March 2017). In response 
to the initial request, the German foreign ministry set up an informal working group on Brexit for the 
government and the Bundesländer after the European summit in the summer 2017. It did not, 
however, invite members of the Bundesrat to attend meetings of the EU Council. 
Finally, parliamentary activities related to Brexit also took place at international level. Members of the 
negotiating team reported to the parliamentary representatives in Brussels during Monday Morning 
Meetings on two occasions – after the notification of Brexit and in December 2017 (Interview with the 
NPR of the Bundesrat, 25/04/2018; Interview with the NPR of the Czech CoD; 2/05/2018). In addition, 
the head of the negotiating team, Michel Barnier, addressed a COSAC meeting in May 2017, and 
Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans addressed a meeting of the COSAC chairpersons in 
January 2018. At these meetings, representatives of the European Affairs Committees of all member 
state parliaments (and some observer parliaments) are gathered. However, these meetings present 
opportunities mainly for the exchange of views among parliaments (and occasionally negotiators) and 
for the collection of first-hand information. None of the interviewees from Germany, Luxembourg or 
the Czech Republic felt that the goal was to reach a joint parliamentary position, or even that 
parliaments were actively trying to find a common position (ibid.; Interview with a member of the 
COSAC secretariat, 26/04/2018; Interview with the NPR of Luxembourg, 25/04/2018; Interview with 
the NPR of the Czech Chamber of Deputies, 2/05/2018). There are two reasons for this: firstly, the 
negotiations themselves are still rather vague and it is far from clear what the general direction of the 
outcome will be, which means that there is no incentive/opportunity for parliaments to discuss 
concrete goals. For example, while both Czech EACs are active at the international level, and 
particularly in COSAC, they found that Brexit was being discussed as a rather abstract issue (Interview 
with Václav Hampl, Chair of the Committee for EU Affairs, Senate of of the Parliament of the Czech 
Republic 23/1/2018, Interview with Ondřej Benešík, Chair of the Committee for EU Affairs, Chamber 
of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 16/1/2018). It was thus overshadowed by more 
concrete and pressing issues like the migration crisis (Interview with Ondřej Benešík, Chair of the 
Committee for EU Affairs, Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 16/1/2018) or 
– in the case of the NPRs – ongoing legislative processes, which are their main task.  
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Secondly, the interests of national parliaments are not uniform with regard to concrete issues. For 
example, the BENELUX countries traditionally cooperate closely, and also do so on Brexit. Their foreign 
ministers met every month in 2018 to discuss this topic. However, while discussions are often 
extremely technical and precise (e.g. on the precise consequences of a hard Brexit on the financial 
sector and existing contracts), the attempts to find a common position are limited. On the one hand, 
Belgium is less interested in the financial sector than Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg is less interested in trade in goods, the customs union etc. than the other two, as it has 
no big ports from which large quantities of goods are shipped from and to the UK. In addition, even 
where interests overlap, e.g. in the banking sectors, countries are not just allies but also competitors, 
which means that they have an interest in keeping their cards close to their chest (Interview with staff 
of the Luxembourgish Parliament, 24/04/2018).  
This has played out differently in the case of the Visegrad Four group. Its meetings were used as a 
space for mutual coordination, particularly if the Visegrad Four meeting preceded a COSAC conference 
(Interview with two employees of the Parliamentary Institute 10/1/2018). The Visegrad Four EAC’s 
share goals and priorities regarding Brexit, and there is a good interpersonal relationship between its 
members. This is creating an excellent space for regular and intensive communication and exchange 
of views on Brexit (Interview with Ondřej Benešík, Chair of the Committee for EU Affairs, Chamber of 
Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 16/1/2018). Brexit holds similar implications6 for the 
Visegrad Four countries´ citizens and their EACs moreover feel that they are going to lose an important 
ally in EU politics (Interview with Ondřej Benešík, Chair of the Committee for EU Affairs, Chamber of 
Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 16/1/2018, Interview with one employee, EU Affairs 
Department, Office of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 10/1/2018), particularly 
those that are not members of the Eurozone (Interview with Ondřej Benešík, Chair of the Committee 
for EU Affairs, Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 16/1/2018). 
Finally, national parliaments also cooperate bilaterally or in smaller groups. The German parliament 
has exchanges with the British parliament, and the BENELUX also meet with the British parliament 
(Interview with staff of the Luxembourgish Parliament, 24/04/2018). In addition, do the parliamentary 
documents show that some bilateral committee meetings of EU-27 parliaments have taken place, and 
that Michel Barnier and other members of the negotiating team have visited national parliaments.  
                                                          
6 A large number of these countries’ citizens are working and living in the United Kingdom. For example, in 2016, 
the largest population of non-British UK residents was Polish people. 
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National interest vs party politics 
Party politics have become, particularly in the recent years, a more important factor of EU politics. This 
goes hand in hand with the increased politicization of the integration process, but also with multiple 
crisis the EU has been facing. In this sense, we expected that the negotiation process could intensify 
government-opposition tensions at parliamentary level and might trigger a different reaction by 
Eurosceptic parties, who might be more sympathetic towards the goal of leaving the EU.  
However, this did not prove to be true. Brexit was not an issue affecting government-opposition 
dynamics. Even the Czech Eurosceptics did not use it as a platform. This is probably hardly surprising 
in the Luxembourgish and German cases, where the EU agenda does not represent a controversial 
issue, but it is surprising in the Czech case, where EU issues have polarized political discussion for many 
years. 
The non-controversial profile of Brexit can be explained particularly by traditional consensual EU 
debates and well-established processes of formulating EU policy. This is true especially for 
Luxembourg. Luxembourg’s population is relatively pro-European in general, and thus the parties are 
also pro-European in general. All three government parties (the Social democrats (LSAP), Liberals (DP), 
Greens (dei Gren)), and the biggest opposition party (the Christian Democrats (CSV)) are pro-European. 
Even the two minor opposition parties – left wing dei Lenk and right-wing ADR – cannot be considered 
as Eurosceptical, but rather as Eurocritical, i.e. they are in favour of EU integration, but would like the 
EU to be more social or to leave more room for the member states. In addition, the next national 
elections are in autumn 2018, and none of the parties’ views Brexit as a theme that could mobilize 
voters (Interviews with an ADR MP, 13.02.18; an LSAP MP, 14.02.18; a CSV MP, 13.04.18; a dei Lenk 
MP, 13.04.18). As a result, both parliamentary documents and interviews confirm that the three 
governmental parties and the CSV have largely identical positions on Brexit (Interview with an LSAP 
MP, 14.02.18; interview with a CSV MP, 13.04.18; interview with an dei Lenk MP, 13.04.18).  
Similarly, in Germany, the coalition parties (until 2017 CDU and SPD) as well as the opposition party 
Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Greens) stand behind the general line of a unified approach of the EU27 and 
do not wish to enter bilateral negotiations or start their own plans with other national parliaments. 
The other opposition party, die LINKE (Leftist party), agrees with the contents of the EU approach, but 
not with the process or rather the handling of the negotiations. Since the new government was formed 
in March 2018, two parties joined the opposition: the centre-right liberal democratic party FDP and 
the right wing Alternative für Deutschland AfD. The former is generally pro-European. The AfD is mildly 
supportive of Germany’s EU membership – although the party is divided on this issue – but is clearly 
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sceptic towards the EU in terms of further integration, immigration, the euro, and bailouts for the 
eurozone. It interpreted Brexit as a confirmation of its own ideology.7 
Probably the most interesting case represents the Czech Republic. Compared to both Germany and 
Luxembourg, the Czech EU discussion has been highly polarized and the Czech political party scene has 
always been characterized by the presence of strong Eurosceptic parties, traditionally in the form of 
the conservative Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Communists (KSČM). Apart from these two “usual 
suspects”, a far right and Eurosceptic party called Freedom of Direct Democracy (SPD) entered the 
scene after the October 2017 elections. Despite all this, there was broad political consensus in the 
Czech parliament regarding the national priorities for Brexit as well as the way in which these should 
be achieved. Formal agreement among major political parties was reached and signed in February 
2017. An initiative for this agreement came out from the opposition – more specifically, it was ODS 
which brought it on the table – which made it more acceptable. The Senate´s EAC chair also 
participated in its drafting (Interview 1, Interview 4).  Moreover, the fact that the Czech position was 
much in line with the EU approach helped to avoid potential controversy around the issue. Insiders 
involved in the process expected that this would not change unless there either was substantial 
reformulation of the Czech EU governmental policy or future Czech and EU priorities drifted apart 
(Interview 3). Despite the absence of political controversy, a number of politicians (and especially the 
EAC chairs) were very active and felt that Brexit was an issue where a lot was at stake for their country 
(Interviews 3 and 4). 
The general lack of controversy does not mean that differences – particularly in terms of dissent voices 
on specific issues – do not exist. In the German case, Die LINKE felt that the Northern Irish question 
could not be settled in the first phase of negotiations. In addition, in terms of citizen’s rights, all German 
parties agreed that the rights should not be diminished and that this a central issue, however, the SPD 
for example believed this could only be settled at the end of the negotiations, whilst Die LINKE thought 
that the rights should have been cast in stone beforehand, to reduce uncertainties for the citizens 
concerned (Interview with SPD 19/04/2018, interview with Die LINKE 13/04/2018). Die LINKE was 
furthermore against putting pressure on completing the negotiations within two years and rather 
wanted to prolong that period. There were also some nuances in language and rhetoric used – for 
example, SPD and Greens adopted rather a harder line against the UK and more frequently use rhetoric 
punishing the UK for the decision to exit than the CDU or Die LINKE (Interview with SPD 19/04/2018, 
interview with Die LINKE 13/04/2018).  
                                                          
7 See for example http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/brexit-referendum/brexit-
news/alternative-fuer-deutschland-brexit-chaos-in-der-afd/13792100.html (accessed May 2018). 
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Similar small hints could be found also in case of Luxembourg. Here, the ADR is somewhat more 
understanding of the British decision to leave the EU, as it is a sister party of the British Conservatives. 
It agrees with them that the EU should return some competences to the member states, but it does 
believe that Luxembourg should remain a EU member state. However, when it comes to the national 
interests to be defended in the negotiations, its position resembled that of the other four parties 
(Interview with an ADR MP, 13.02.18). Dei Lenk was the only party that was positioning itself differently 
in term of contents: for example, it perceived Brexit as a result of the weak social dimension of the EU, 
and it criticized the focus of the government on the financial sector (Interview with a dei Lenk MP, 
13.04.18).  
Finally, we would have expected the national parliaments to discuss different issues, depending on 
which issues are the most salient for the respective countries. In fact, the parliaments discussed a 
similar range of issues, but there were differences in how much emphases were placed on specific 
issues.  
During the first phase of negotiations, the three issues discussed between the EU and the UK were 
citizen’s rights, the Northern Ireland border and the financial settlement. These issues were also taken 
up in the broader debates within the parliaments of the Czech Republic, Germany and Luxembourg. 
This first phase of the negotiations was moreover characterized by an overwhelming unity of the EU-
27, represented through Michel Barnier in the negotiations with the UK. The parliaments of the three 
countries backed this approach and are clear on ‘no cherry-picking’ as well as the non-negotiability of 
the four freedoms and the single market. 
However, beyond these topics, we observe that the three parliaments focused on issues of national 
salience. Luxembourg is home to a prominent financial sector and thus the impact of Brexit on the 
latter has become the most salient issue in Luxembourg. Germany, the country with the biggest 
economic weight in the EU, is concerned about an aversion amongst the public to paying a larger share 
of the EU budget after the leave of the UK. Without any reforms, Germany’s share in the EU budget 
will rise considerably. The CDU in the Bundestag, part of the coalition government, is supporting a 
proposed reform of the EU budgetary system in view of Brexit. The oppositional Green party, on the 
other hand, suggested to increase Germany’s share of the budget by 8%, which they believe would fill 
the gap created by the UK’s exit and also Die LINKE is prepared to pay a larger part (Interview with Die 
LINKE 13/04/2018). The Bundesrat, too, is focussing its scrutiny on the EU budget, because with the 
UK leaving the EU, Germany becomes - statistically - economically stronger and the new Bundesländer 
lose the right to EU financial support. In the Czech Republic, both, the Chamber of Deputies as well as 




National parliaments´ involvement in EU politics has increased in recent years. Their current activities 
in the Brexit process confirm this development. Indeed, the national parliaments analysed are 
surprisingly active given the low activity scores of some in Auel et al. (2015). So far, their interest in 
national as well as international level developments has been continuous and driven by events and 
actions taking place outside domestic constituencies, in particular, European Council meetings and 
milestones in the negotiation process.  
To what extent does Brexit represent a unique opportunity for national parliaments to further increase 
their power in the EU policies of their states? Based upon existing literature, we expected their 
behaviour in the Brexit process to follow already established patterns – institutional strength and 
capacity playing a role as well as a focus on key national priorities. We also expected unicameral 
systems to pursue different scrutiny activities to bicameral systems. 
Our findings confirm our initial assumptions only partly. The constitutional dimension was probably 
closest to the bull´s eye – as expected, we found the different parliaments, unicameral, and the upper 
and lower houses in the bicameral parliaments, to vary in their approach to Brexit scrutiny or rather 
their interpretation of their role vis-à-vis the government on Brexit-related issues. However, all 
chambers were found to be active in their chosen roles: Whether as active scrutinizers and arena for 
active debate (Czech Senate, Bundestag, Czech Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourg parliament) or as 
policy shapers (Czech Senate, Bundesrat). 
Regarding the procedural level, we did not find remarkable differences among chambers in terms of 
their involvement and activity, as assumed. Parliaments have in general followed similar patterns of 
behaviour, focusing particularly on information gathering and government monitoring. Even though 
some chambers have adjusted their scrutiny mechanisms, the vast majority of their activities have 
been taken up in already established procedures and frameworks (except for the Bundestag, which set 
up a weekly Brexit correspondence). Moreover, parliaments have not tried to challenge governmental 
primacy in Brexit negotiations so far (except for the Bundesrat), thus adopting a reactive approach. 
Thus, neither our three case study parliaments, nor the Irish, Spanish, Belgian or Polish parliaments 
studied in other chapters have used Brexit as an opportunity to extend their powers vis-à-vis 
government (Bar Cendón 2019; Barrett 2019; Boronska-Hryniewiecka 2019; Brack and Sierens 2019). 
Although chambers talked about different issues and put a different emphasis on issues – partly 
dependent on nationally salient topics – all of them have covered and agreed on the EU’s Brexit 
priorities such as citizens’ rights´ protection, the Northern Ireland question, and the financial 
settlement between the UK and the EU.  
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Most surprisingly, the party politics expectation was not confirmed at all. The first stage of negotiations 
did not increase government-opposition tension, neither was it exploited differently by Eurosceptics 
and by pro EU parties. This finding holds for all three countries, including the Czech Republic, where 
the EU agenda generally is a very controversial topic. We identified some voices of dissent – particularly 
in Germany – but these addressed mainly procedural or smaller issues and did not disagree with the 
content of the general consensus on Brexit. Interestingly, this finding is also largely repeated across 
the other chapters looking at national parliaments and Brexit (Bar Cendón 2019; Barrett 2019; 
Boronska-Hryniewiecka 2019; Brack and Sierens 2019): The authors analysing the Irish, Spanish and 
Belgian parliaments also found that there was no government-opposition divide on the substance of 
Brexit and that all parties rallied around a joint vision of national interest. In Poland, Brexit led to 
disagreements between Eurosceptic and pro-European parties. However, as in the Luxembourgish 
case, these disagreements appear to focus on the interpretation of the causes of Brexit rather than 
desirable outcomes, with some Luxembourgish and Polish MPs expressing ‘understanding’ for the 
decision to leave the EU. This– in their view – was grounded in the EU’s shortcomings.  
Our findings should be considered in context, which explains why some assumptions were met and 
some were not. Firstly, even though Brexit touches upon several important issues, it did not headline 
the daily political agenda of the analysed countries. The low political salience of the Brexit negotiations 
was further strengthened by the fact that there was wide consensus on national priorities among 
relevant political forces in the EU, as well as broad support for the existing EU approach. In the period 
analysed, the talks between the EU and the UK touched mainly general topics and issues where 
consensus – at least on the EU side – could easily be reached. Therefore, Brexit – or at least the first 
phase of its negotiations – failed to trigger party political competition. 
The question is, if this development continues into the later stages of the Brexit talks. Our prediction 
is that it probably will and that the Brexit parliamentary game in the countries analysed is also likely to 
follow a consensual pattern in the future. So far, the main sources of disagreement are issues related 
to the future of the EU-27 after Brexit (e.g. the multiannual financial framework), but those discussions 
are not directly related to the Brexit negotiations. This could of course change when more detailed and 
specific issues are discussed and when national governments may try to promote – or block – special 
deals with the UK in concrete sectors and policy areas. Here the question is whether potential 
controversies could be utilized by national parliaments – but considering the highly technical nature of 
such discussions, substantial change is unlikely. This prediction was supported by some of our 
interviewees – for example, German MPs interviewed (Interview with CDU 27/04/2018; interview with 
SPD 19/04/2018) did not expect the support for a united EU approach to flag. Even though some 
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chambers demanded special procedures for Brexit scrutiny – the German Bundestag and Czech Senate 
– actual parliamentary activity requires other sources of motivation.  
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